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ABSTRACT 
The vision of nomadic computing with its ubiquitous access has 
stimulated much interest in the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking 
(MANET) technology. However, its proliferation strongly 
depends on the availability of security provisions, among other 
factors. In the open, collaborative MANET environment 
practically any node can maliciously or selfishly disrupt and deny 
communication of other nodes. In this paper, we present and 
evaluate the Secure Message Transmission (SMT) protocol, 
which safeguards the data transmission against arbitrary malicious 
behavior of other nodes. SMT is a lightweight, yet very effective, 
protocol that can operate solely in an end-to-end manner. It 
exploits the redundancy of multi-path routing and adapts its 
operation to remain efficient and effective even in highly adverse 
environments. SMT is capable of delivering up to 250% more 
data messages than a protocol that does not secure the data 
transmission. Moreover, SMT outperforms an alternative single-
path protocol, a secure data forwarding protocol we term Secure 
Single Path (SSP) protocol. SMT imposes up to 68% less routing 
overhead than SSP, delivers up to 22% more data packets and 
achieves end-to-end delays that are up to 94% lower than those of 
SSP. Thus, SMT is better suited to support QoS for real-time 
communications in the ad hoc networking environment. The 
security of data transmission is achieved without restrictive 
assumptions on the network nodes’ trust and network 
membership, without the use of intrusion detection schemes, and 
at the expense of moderate multi-path transmission overhead 
only. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The communication in mobile ad hoc networks comprises two 
phases, the route discovery and the data transmission. In an 
adverse environment, both phases are vulnerable to a variety of 
attacks. First, adversaries can disrupt the route discovery by 
impersonating the destination, by responding with stale or 
corrupted routing information, or by disseminating forged control 
traffic. This way, attackers can obstruct the propagation of 
legitimate route control traffic and adversely influence the 
topological knowledge of benign nodes. However, adversaries can 
also disrupt the data transmission phase and, thus, incur 
significant data loss by tampering with, fraudulently redirecting, 
or even dropping data traffic or injecting forged data packets.  
To provide comprehensive security, both phases of MANET 
communication must be safeguarded. It is noteworthy that secure 
routing protocols, which ensure the correctness of the discovered 
topology information, cannot by themselves ensure the secure and 
undisrupted delivery of transmitted data. This is so, since 
adversaries could abide with the route discovery and be placed on 
utilized routes. But then, they could tamper with the in-transit 
data in an arbitrary manner and degrade the network operation.  
Upper layer mechanisms, such as reliable transport protocols, or 
mechanisms currently assumed by the MANET routing protocols, 
such as reliable data link or acknowledged routing, cannot cope 
with malicious disruptions of the data transmission. In fact, the 
communicating nodes may be easily deceived for relatively long 
periods of time, thinking that the data flow is undisrupted, while 
no actual communication takes place. 
One way to counter security attacks would be to 
cryptographically protect and authenticate all control and data 
traffic. But to accomplish this, nodes would have to have the 
means to establish the necessary trust relationships with each and 
every peer they are transiently associated with, including nodes 
that just forward their data. Even if this were feasible, such 
cryptographic protection cannot be effective against denial of 
service attacks, with adversaries simply discarding data packets. 
To secure the data transmission phase, we propose and evaluate 
the Secure Message Transmission (SMT) protocol, an end-to-end 
secure data forwarding protocol tailored to the MANET 
communication requirements.  The SMT protocol safeguards pair-
wise communication across an unknown frequently changing 
network, possibly in the presence of adversaries that may exhibit 
arbitrary behavior. It combines four elements: end-to-end secure 
and robust feedback mechanism, dispersion of the transmitted 
data, simultaneous usage of multiple paths, and adaptation to the 
network changing conditions. SMT detects and tolerates 
compromised transmissions, while adapting its operation to 
provide secure data forwarding with low delays.  
We underline that the goal of SMT is not to securely discover 
routes in the network – the security of this phase should be 
achieved by one of the protocols proposed in the literature 
[1,2,5,23-25].1 The goal of SMT is to ensure secure data 
forwarding, after the discovery of routes between the source and 
the destination has been already performed. In other words, SMT 
assumes that there is a protocol that discovers routes in the ad hoc 
network, although such discovered routes may not be free of 
malicious nodes.2 Then, the goal of SMT is to ensure routing over 
such routes, despite of the presence of such adversaries. 
In addition to SMT, we present and evaluate here the Secure 
Single Path (SSP) protocol, an end-to-end secure data forwarding 
protocol that utilizes a single route. Unlike SMT, SSP does not 
incur multi-path transmission overhead. Thus, it does not require 
that the underlying routing protocol discover multiple routes 
either. As a result, SSP imposes less routing overhead per 
discovery than SMT. Overall, we examine SSP and compare it to 
SMT as an alternative, lower cost, more flexible protocol to 
secure the data-forwarding phase.  
Our results show that SMT outperforms SSP consistently over a 
wide range of experiments. The advantages of SMT over SSP 
become more pronounced in highly adverse environments: SMT 
delivers up to 22% more data packets than SSP, and achieves up 
to 94% lower delays than SSP. It is also very interesting that SMT 
imposes up to 68% less routing overhead than SSP, although 
overhead was expected to be lower for SSP. In contrast, SSP 
provides only up to 48% lower transmission overhead than SMT. 
We especially emphasize the low-delay characteristic of SMT, as 
we believe that one of the main applications of SMT is in support 
of QoS for real-time traffic.3 
In the rest of the paper, we first provide an overview of the 
SMT protocol and present its operation. Then, in Section 4, we 
outline the operation of SSP and evaluate the performance of the 
two protocols. Related work is discussed next, followed by a 
discussion and description of future work in Section 6, before our 
conclusion. 
                                                                
1 Nevertheless, care should be taken in such a selection, as some 
protocols can support single-path forwarding and others 
multiple route discovery. 
2 Clearly, an adversary could hide its malicious behavior for a 
long period of time and strike at the least expected time – it 
would be impossible to discover such an adversary prior to its 
attack. 
3 SMT, due to its operation over multiple paths, allows 
elimination of retransmissions of packets that were lost due to 
adversarial nodes. 
2. OVERVIEW OF SMT 
SMT requires a security association (SA) only between the two 
end communicating nodes – the source and the destination. Since 
a pair of nodes chooses to employ a secure communication 
scheme, their ability to authenticate each other is indispensable. 
The trust relationship can be instantiated, for example, by the 
knowledge of the public key of the other communicating end.4 
However, none of the end nodes needs to be securely associated 
with any of the remaining network nodes. As a result, SMT does 
not require cryptographic operations at these intermediate nodes.  
With SMT, at any particular time, the two communicating end 
nodes make use of a set of diverse, preferably node-disjoint paths 
that are deemed valid at that time. We refer to such a set of paths 
as the Active Path Set (APS). The source first invokes the 
underlying route discovery protocol, updates its network topology 
view, and then determines the initial APS for communication with 
the specific destination. 
With a set of routes at hand, the source disperses each outgoing 
message into a number of pieces. At the source, the dispersion, 
based on the algorithm in [3], introduces redundancy and encodes 
the outgoing messages, as described in Section 3.2. At the 
destination, a dispersed message is successfully reconstructed, 
provided that sufficiently many pieces are received. In other 
words, the message dispersion ensures successful reception even 
if a fraction of the message pieces is lost or corrupted, either due 
to the existence of malicious nodes, or due to the unavailability of 
routes (e.g., breakage of a route as a result of nodes’ mobility). 
Each dispersed piece is transmitted across a different route and 
carries a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [4], so that the 
destination can verify its integrity and the authenticity of its 
origin. The destination validates the incoming pieces and 
acknowledges the successfully received ones through a feedback 
back to the source. 
The feedback mechanism is also secure and fault tolerant: it is 
cryptographically protected and dispersed as well. This way, the 
source receives authentic feedback that explicitly specifies the 
pieces that were received by the destination. A successfully 
received piece implies that the corresponding route is 
operational,5 while a failure is a strong indication that the route is 
either broken or compromised. 
While transmitting across the APS, the source updates the rating 
of the APS paths. For each successful or failed piece, the rating of 
the corresponding path is increased or decreased, respectively, as 
we explain in Section 3.3. A path is discarded once it is deemed 
failed and a precaution is taken not to use the same path, if it is 
discovered again within some time after it has been discarded. 
While continuously assessing the quality of the utilized paths, the 
protocol adapts its operation according to the feedback it receives 
from the trusted destination. Based on its interaction with the 
network, the protocol adjusts its configuration to remain effective 
in highly adverse environments and efficient in relatively benign 
conditions. 
                                                                
4 The two nodes can negotiate a shared secret key, e.g., via the 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm [16,18] and then, using 
the SA, verify that the principal that participated in the 
exchange was indeed the trusted node. For the rest of the 
discussion, we assume the existence of a shared secret key KS,T. 
5 Although this does not ensure that the path is free of malicious 
nodes. 
If a sufficient number of pieces are received at the destination, 
the destination proceeds to reconstruct the message. Otherwise, if 
a dispersed message cannot be reconstructed at the destination, it 
awaits the missing packets that are retransmitted by the source. 
The number of re-transmissions is limited to Retrymax per serviced 
message.  
An illustrative example of a single message transmission is 
shown in Fig. 1. The sender disperses the encoded message into 
four packets, so that any three out of the four packets are 
sufficient for successful reconstruction of the original message. 
The four packets are routed over four disjoint paths and two of 
them arrive intact at the receiver. The remaining two packets are 
compromised by malicious nodes lying on the corresponding 
paths; for example, one packet is dropped, and one (dashed arrow) 
is modified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Simple example of the SMT protoco
The receiver extracts the information from the first 
validated packet and waits for subsequent packets, while
reception timer. When the fourth packet arrives, the cryp
integrity check reveals the data tampering and the 
rejected. At the expiration of the timer, the receiver gen
acknowledgement reporting the two successfully receive
and feedbacks the acknowledgment across the two o
paths. 
It is sufficient for the sender to receive and cryptogr
validate only one acknowledgement, ignoring duplicates
failing paths are discarded and the two missing pieces
retransmitted over other paths; one of the two packets is
for example, because of intermittent malicious behav
benign path breakage. The receiver acknowledges the s
reception immediately, before the timer expiration, 
adequate number of packets (3 out of 4) have been recei
that after transmission of the first packet, the send
retransmission timer, so that total loss of all the message
of all the acknowledgments can be detected. 
 
3. DETAILS OF SMT OPERATION 
3.1 Determination of the APS 
SMT can operate with any underlying routing 
although the use of a secure protocol is essential to
benefits of SMT. Otherwise, adversaries could
communication by continuously providing false
information. SMT is independent of the route discovery 
for example, it can operate in conjunction with a reac
proactive protocol. However, the knowledge of the actual nodal 
connectivity and the use of source routing result in two 
advantages. First, it is possible for the sender to implement an 
arbitrary path selection algorithm in order to increase the 
reliability of the data transmission. For example, the path 
selection algorithm could incorporate subjective criteria, such as 
nodes to be explicitly included or excluded from the APS. 
Second, no discretion on route decisions is left to intermediate 
nodes, in order to enhance the robustness of the protocol. This 
way, the communicating end nodes can explicitly correlate the 
failed or successful transmissions with the corresponding routes. 
As a result, non-operational and possibly compromised routes are 
unambiguously detected at the source node, so that newly 
determined routes can be entirely different from previously 
utilized and discarded routes. For the rest of the paper, we assume 
that a secure routing protocol provides a number of routes to SMT, 
every time the route discovery protocol is executed. The source 
constructs an APS of k node-disjoint paths, depending on the 
actual node connectivity of its topology view. 
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3.2 Message Dispersion and Transmission 
The information dispersal scheme is based on Rabin’s algorithm 
[3], which acts in essence as an erasure code: it adds limited 
redundancy to the data to allow recovery from a number of faults. 
The message and the redundancy are divided into a number of 
pieces, so that even a partial reception can lead to the successful 
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re-construction of the message at the receiver. In principle, the 
encoding (and dispersion) allows the reconstruction of the original 
message with successful reception of any M out of N transmitted 
pieces. The ratio r = N/M is termed the redundancy factor. 
Messages, i.e., raw data, can be viewed as a stream of integers, 
or m-bit characters, so that each integer is in the [0…2m-1] range. 
It suffices to select a prime number p > 2m-1, so that all encoding 
and decoding operations are performed in a finite field mod p.7 
Initially, N random M-vectors, organized as rows {ai} of matrix 
A, are selected, with any M of them linearly independent. These ai 
vectors can be constructed by selecting N different elements ui of 
the finite field and set ai=[1,ui,…,uiM-1], 1≤ i≤ N, and N<p. The 
vectors of matrix A should be selected from a pre-computed set 
used by both ends, which we assume are agreed upon as part of 
the SA establishment process. 
The encoding of a message first segments the original message 
of length FS into L sequences of characters, each of length M, 
with padding if necessary. The segments of the original message 
are denoted by s1, s2, …, sL and they are arranged as columns of 
an M-by-L array B. Then, each piece wi of the dispersed message 
is created as a character sequence of length L: to do so, the 
original message segments are multiplied by the corresponding 
random vector ai, and the resultant piece is wi=[ais1, ais2, …, 
aisL]. 
Upon reception of any M pieces, the original message can be 
reconstructed. Let v1, v2,…, vM denote the M pieces used for 
reconstruction, which are in fact a subset of the N transmitted 
                                                                
7 The operations can be performed in finite fields of the form 
GF(2m), to avoid the use of excessive bits per represented 
character. For example, if 8-bit characters are used, the use of 
p=257 imposes an excess of one bit per character, while GF(28) 
suffices, without the excess [3,17]. 
scovering 
pieces, wi. 8 Each one of the vi pieces corresponds to one of the ai 
vectors, which are, by definition, linearly independent. The matrix 
 comprising these vectors is thus invertible. To 
reconstruct the original message, it suffices to multiply each of 
the v
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Figure 2. Example of the IDA operation with r=N/M=4/3. (i) 
Matrix A holds N=4 random vectors, (ii) a message of FS = 64 
bytes is segmented (after padding) into L = 22 segments, 
which are the columns of matrix B, (iii) the dispersed message, 
with its pieces as rows of matrix W, (iv) the partially received 
message (3 out of 4 pieces), along the rows of W’, (v) the 
random vectors that correspond to the M received pieces, and 
(vi) the reconstructed message, identical to the original B. (All 
data values are 8-bit integers, shown in their hexadecimal 
representation.) 
Fig. 2 provides an illustrative example of the IDA operation, 
continuing the example in Fig. 1. N=4 pieces are sent and M=3 
pieces are received and used in the message reconstruction at the 
receiver, i.e., r = 4/3. Raw data are treated as bytes and take 
values between 0 and 255. The encoding and decoding operations 
are performed in the GF(28) finite field. Matrix A is created based 
on the (randomly) selected ui = {69, 125, 176, 91}, and it is 
shown in Fig. 2(i). The message has size FS=64 bytes and it is 
padded with   FSMFSMPD −⋅=  bytes. The message is 
segmented into the L = (FS+PD)/M columns of B (Fig. 2(ii)). The 
encoded message W is shown in Fig. 2(iii), with each row of the 
array being one piece to be dispersed through the network. Now, 
for instance, let the w4 piece be the one that is never received by 
the destination. The message pieces available to the receiver are 
the rows of matrix W’ shown on Fig. 2(iv). Matrix A’ holds the 
{ai} vectors that correspond to the received pieces, and the 
reconstructed message, shown on Fig. 2(vi), is identical to the 
transmitted one. 
3.3 APS Adaptation 
As the source transmits the dispersed messages across the APS, 
it updates the ratings of the utilized paths based on the feedback 
(or its absence) provided by the destination. Each path is 
associated with two ratings: a short-term and a long-term rating. 
The short-term rating, rs, is decreased by a constant α each time a 
failed transmission is reported, and it is increased by a constant β 
for each successful reception. The long-term rating, rl, is a 
fraction of successfully received (and in fact, acknowledged) 
pieces over the total number of pieces transmitted across the 
route. If either rs or rl or both drop below a threshold value, rsthr 
and rlthr respectively, the corresponding path is discarded. Both 
thresholds and constants are protocol selectable parameters.  
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The rs rating takes values in the interval I = [rsthr, rsmax], with 
rsthr ≥ 0, rsmax  the maximum value for the path rating, and rs(0) its 
initial rating, assigned when a path is first added to the APS.9 The 
constants α and β take values in the (0,rsmax] interval. After the i-
th transmission across a path that is not deemed failed yet, its 
rating is updated: 
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If i transmissions across a path include s successfully received 
(thus acknowledged) pieces and l lost ones, then i = s + l, with s, l 
integers. If rs(i) has already reached the maximum value, then, 
additional successive acknowledged pieces do not increase the 
rating any further. If s0 denotes the number of such successful 
receptions, and s1 denotes the number of successful receptions 
while the path rating is below rsmax, then s=s0+s1. Thus, the 
rating of the path can be written as rs(i) = rs(0)+ βs1 - αl. For any 
route that is not deemed failed yet, rs(i) ≥ rsthr. Then, s1β - lα ≥ 
rsthr - rs(0), (for s1, l integers not simultaneously zero). If we set d 
= rs(0) - rsthr ≥ 0, we can re-write the previous inequality as: 
β s1 - αl + d ≥  0          (2) 
The rating mechanism should guarantee that a non-operational 
route is promptly discarded, independently of its prior history. In 
other words, the detection of route failures should be fast even for 
routes that were fully operational for a long period of time and 
their rating reached its maximum allowed value, rsmax. In that 
case, the failed route would be discarded after at most f = (rsmax - 
rsthr)/α successive failed transmissions. The value of f can be 
regulated by selecting, for example, an appropriate value for the 
constant α. If f is low (e.g., 1), a transient failure will result in 
discarding an operational path, while a high f may allow repeated 
transmissions over a broken path and thus overhead before 
determining the path breakage. 
                                                                
                                                                
Nevertheless, an adversary lying on a path may select an 
arbitrary attack pattern to disrupt the transmissions without letting 
rs(i) to drop below rsthr. This way, the attacker can retain its 
ability to degrade the network operation, trying to maximize the 
number of dropped data packets, while the route is still considered 8 In case more than M pieces are received, the first M could be 
used for the reconstruction of the message, for efficiency 
reasons. Another option would be to use the M most credible 
pieces, if soft-detection decoding is used.  
9 The initial value is set to , with 0<δ<1.  )()0( max thrsss rrr −⋅= δ
operational. Intuitively, the attacker would be most effective if it 
never allows the reception of data pieces when the path rating is 
equal to rsmax (i.e., s0=0).  
In order to determine precisely the effectiveness of the path 
rating mechanism, we define the bandwidth loss over a path, 
BWL, as the fraction of packets that an adversary can discard or 
corrupt without the route determined to be non-operational (i.e., 
Eq. (2) holds for the route). Based on the previous discussion, the 
BWL for i transmissions (s successful and l failed ones) across a 
single path is 
ls
l
i
lBWL +==      (3) 
For any number of successfully received packets, s≤ i, that the 
attacker allowed to reach the destination, the attacker can select 
any l packets to drop without being detected. Clearly, l ≤ i – s and 
from Eq. (2’), (with α≠0, β≠0) l will be 


 +≤ βα
β dsl        (4) 
Thus, the maximum number of dropped packets is 


 += βα
β dsl*       (4’) 
The BWL would be maximized when l is maximized (l = l*). As 
the number of transmissions increases and, thus, s increases, we 
get from Eq. (4’) and Eq. (3): 
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* lim
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s
BWL    (5) 
The bound for data loss provided in Eq. (5) is independent of 
the attack pattern. Thus, a judicious selection of α and β can 
reduce the impact of an intelligent adversary that stays 
undetected. Clearly, it is necessary for α not to be zero (α > 0); 
otherwise, the attacker would have full control over a path (BWL* 
= 1). Furthermore, it must hold that α > β, in order to keep 
BWL*< 0.5; in fact, the smaller β is compared to α, the lower 
BWL* will be.10  
Depending on the selection of values for α and β, the loss of 
data could be significant, especially if the utilized route that 
contains the intelligent attacker is a long-lived one. An additional 
line of defense is provided by rl, whose threshold can be set to 
detect a possible abuse of the rs rating. If the running average of 
delivered over transmitted pieces drops below an acceptable 
threshold, then the path is discarded independently of the rs 
rating. For example, if β/α =1/10, an adversary could discard 
approximately 9% of the transmitted packets; then, rlthr could be 
set equal to 95% for instance to ensure lower loss of data.  
The mechanisms for updating both the rs and rl are necessary, 
because we cannot make any assumption on the attack pattern. An 
adversary could be latent for a long period, exhibiting fully 
benign behavior, and be activated exactly when it can cause the 
greatest harm. Or it could behave maliciously in an intermittent 
and apparently pseudo-random manner. SMT can mitigate such 
malicious behavior since it does not rely on “test packets” or a 
“testing period” to assess the path security. Such an approach 
would fail, since the communicating nodes can be easily misled to 
deem all paths as “safe.” For instance, if the adversary can 
distinguish the test packets, it could forward them and later 
tamper with the actual data. If test packets are indistinguishable, 
then, the adversary needs to forward a number of packets until the 
end of the testing period, and then launch its attack.11 And the 
more extensive the testing period, the higher the imposed 
transmission overhead and delay, without any guarantee that the 
“security” of the paths could be determined and malicious nodes 
could be isolated.  
In contrast, while SMT transmits data, it provides effective 
probing at a low-cost due to the simultaneous routing across 
multiple routes. In other words, the actual routing across APS 
allows determination of the paths’ condition. The transmission of 
a piece across a low-rated path, although it may appear as a costly 
operation, can be, indeed, beneficial. Due to the message 
dispersion, the source can easily tolerate loss of a piece, if indeed 
the path is not operational. At the same time, if the reduction of 
the rating was due to transient faults (either malicious or benign), 
the successfully received piece will still contribute to the re-
construction of the message and, possibly, to the re-instatement of 
the path rating. 
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Our experiments verify that the proposed protocol can, indeed, 
successfully cope with a high number of adversaries, while 
operating only in an end-to-end manner. SMT can deliver 
successfully more than twice the number of packets delivered by 
a protocol that secures only the route discovery phase but not the 
data-forwarding phase. Moreover, we find that SMT is successful 
in delivering data with low end-to-end delay, low routing 
overhead, and limited transmission overhead, when compared to 
SSP.  
The Secure Single Path (SSP) protocol is the limiting case of 
SMT without the dispersion of outgoing messages and the use of 
a single path for each message transmission. SSP is equipped with 
the same end-to-end feedback and the fault detection mechanisms 
as SMT. SSP also re-transmits each failed message Retrymax 
times, provides data integrity, authenticity, and replay protection 
as SMT does, and selects the shortest path in hops. SSP 
determines, utilizes, and maintains a single path only. Once the 
utilized path is deemed failed, a new route discovery may be 
needed in order to determine a new route.  
                                                                
                                                                
We evaluate here three protocols: (i) a single-path data 
forwarding protocol that does not employ any security mechanism 
to protect data transmissions, which we term the Non-Secure 
Single Path (NSP) protocol, (ii) the SSP protocol, and (iii) the 
SMT protocol. In all cases, we assume that the route discovery is 
secured, that is, the correctness of the discovered connectivity 
information is guaranteed.12 Here, the secure discovery of one or 
more routes is performed by the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) 
11 If the content of the packets can be analyzed, the attack could 
be selective, targeting packets of high importance. The selection 
of the packets to corrupt could depend on the knowledge of the 
employed protocols and the supported applications or could be 
purely subjective. For example, the loss of the last message of a 
multi-round interactive protocol can have a severe impact. 
10 Care should be taken in the selection of β, since very small β 
values will cause very slow reinstatement of paths after 
experiencing short and transient losses. 12 But, again, this does not imply paths free of malicious nodes. 
[1,2]. Multiple routes are discovered for SMT at the expense of 
increased overhead per route discovery, while a single route is 
discovered for SSP and NSP. We do not make any additional trust 
assumptions beyond the end-to-end security associations. Each 
source is securely associated with one destination, and sources 
transmit data to the same destination throughout the simulated 
period. OPNETTM simulation models were implemented. 
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Figure 3. Fraction of delivered messages. (a) SMT, (b) NSP, 
(c) SSP. 
The network coverage area is a 1000m by 1000m square with 
50 mobile nodes, with any two nodes able to communicate if they 
are within the reception distance, which is set to 300m. The 
resultant network topologies are bi-connected with high 
probability, i.e., for any two nodes it is highly likely that two 
node disjoint paths exist [22]. The nodes are initially uniformly 
distributed throughout the network area and their movement is 
determined by the random waypoint mobility model [7]. The node 
speed is uniformly distributed between 1 m/sec and 20 m/sec, and 
the pause times (PT) are 0, 20, 50, and 100 sec, with the simulated 
time equal to 300 seconds. The supported data rate is 2Mbps, and 
the medium access control protocol models transmission, 
queuing, and propagation delays and provides reliable 
communication at the data link level. Ten constant-bit-rate 
sources generate 4 messages/second with message/packet payload 
of 64 bytes. We note that the size of the buffer was not a limiting 
factor, i.e., no packets were lost due to buffer overflow at the 
source node. Each point on the presented graphs corresponds to 
the average over 15 randomly seeded runs and the number of 
adversarial nodes varies: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 attackers. 
Our model is equivalent to the model that the attackers comply 
with the route discovery phase, relaying all the route requests, 
replies, or route and link state updates, in order to be placed on 
one or more utilized routes. Once they become part of a utilized 
route, attackers discard all data packets forwarded across the 
route(s) they belong to. Adversaries have the same features as the 
benign nodes (mobility, reception range) and are not assigned as 
sources or destinations. The protocol parameters used for these 
experiments include Retrymax=3, rsthr=0.0, rsmax=1.0, α=0.5, 
β=0.05. 
The benefit from the presence of SMT is clearly shown in Fig. 
3. In Fig. 3(a), SMT delivers more than 99% of the transmitted 
messages within the range of 5 to 15 adversaries, and more than 
96% of the packets even when 50% of the nodes are malicious. In 
contrast, the fast degradation of the NSP protocol comes as no 
surprise, as shown in Fig. 3(b). The average SMT improvement 
ranges from 32% to 250% as the number of adversaries increases. 
Without a mechanism that can detect malicious faults, an NSP 
source can detect a compromised route only if a link breakage is 
reported. This is true for any reactive secure routing protocol that 
does not secure the data transmission phase. In a malicious 
setting, such feedback could reach the source if it originated from 
a node at an upstream position relative to the first attacker lying 
on the route. As a result, even a small fraction of adversaries can 
inflict substantial packet loss – for example, with NSP and 5 
adversaries present (10% of the network nodes), the average 
fraction of data packets dropped at the adversaries over the total 
number of transmitted packets ranges from 20% to 28%, 
depending on the node mobility. We re-emphasize that NSP does 
not re-transmit data. 
Although SSP can cope with adversaries much better than NSP, 
as Fig. 3(c) suggests, it becomes less effective as the number of 
adversaries increases, delivering, for example, only 84% of the 
data with 20 adversaries present. More importantly, SMT delivers 
3% to 22% more messages than SSP. SMT is more effective than 
SSP due the use of multiple paths and the message dispersion, 
which allow the delivery of data mainly without retransmissions. 
In contrast, SSP lacks the SMT’s ability to simultaneously probe a 
set of routes; moreover, SSP can deliver a dropped message only 
by re-transmitting it. As a result, SSP (re-) transmissions may be 
successively attempted across (newly discovered) routes that are 
compromised, with messages lost after Retrymax attempts.13 
                                                                
13 Clearly, the fraction of delivered data could approach 100% if 
the number of allowed retransmissions increased. However, 
such an improvement would come at the expense of 
significantly higher delays.  
The most important advantage of SMT over SSP is revealed by 
the comparison of Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b): SMT achieves 
dramatically lower end-to-end delays for all conducted 
experiments. The end-to-end delay is calculated from the time the 
message is created at the application layer until it is successfully 
delivered and after experiencing queuing and transmission delays 
to the destination, including possible re-transmissions. The 
average is taken over all received messages. The difference 
between SMT and SSP is evident even for completely or 
relatively benign environments, while SSP’s delay increases at a 
much higher rate, as the number of adversaries increase. SMT 
achieves on the average a 94% (for 5 adversaries) to 84% (25 
adversaries) decrease in delay over SSP, when the pause time 
(PT) ranges from 0 sec to 50 sec, with SMT’s improvement 
ranging from 94% to 73% for the case of more static networks 
(PT = 100). However, the most important observation is not the 
percentage of the decrease in delay, but rather its absolute values. 
SMT’s delays are from 3 to 48 times lower than those for SSP. 
The only exception is the case for 25 adversaries and PT = 100, 
where the delay of SMT is approximately half of the delay of 
SSP. 
We also observe that lower mobility is detrimental to the 
protocol operation, or, inversely, higher mobility is conducive to 
the SMT’s (and SSP’s) goal, which is the successful and fast 
delivery of data at their destination. In our experiments, the higher 
the pause time, the lower the mobility. The more static the 
network is, the more probable it is for successive route 
discoveries to include the same adversaries and hold data buffered 
at their sources until “safe” route(s) are discovered. Fig. 4 shows 
that delays are in general higher when the mobility is lower, with 
the trend becoming clearer for high numbers of adversaries. 
The successive route discoveries, which are necessary when 
compromised routes are repeatedly discovered, are responsible for 
the increase of the routing overhead, shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 
5(b), as the number of adversaries increase. The routing overhead 
is calculated as the ratio of all the transmitted routing query 
packets over the number of successfully received messages. The 
impact of decreasing mobility is apparent on the routing overhead 
curves as well. 
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Figure 5. Routing overhead (RTOV). (a) SMT, (b) SSP. 
(b) It is important to note that SMT imposes significantly lower 
routing overhead than SSP, as the comparison between Fig. 5(a) 
and Fig. 5(b) shows. On the average, SMT achieves up to 68% 
decrease in routing overhead (up to 63% decrease when the 
PT=100 scenarios are accounted for). The reason for this 
improvement is that SMT can mask route failures much more 
effectively than SSP does, and thus requires much less frequent 
route discoveries than SSP. To probe further, we take a look at the 
components of the routing overhead per discovery: the 
broadcasted route query packets, and the route reply packets. 
Both SMT and SSP discoveries incur the same cost due to route 
 
Figure 4. End-to-end message delay. (a) SMT, (b) SSP. 
As the number of adversaries increases, it is more likely that the 
discovered route(s) will include adversaries. Thus, it becomes 
more probable that transmitted data will be lost, and that 
messages will be received after one or more retransmissions. As a 
result, the end-to-end delay increases as the number of adversaries 
increase. This is especially true for SSP, which relies on 
retransmissions and thus suffers higher end-to-end delays. 
query packets. But SMT incurs approximately 6 times higher cost 
due to route replies. Nevertheless, SMT requires 57% to 76% 
fewer route discoveries than SSP in an adversarial environment 
(with 19% to 28% improvement when there are no adversaries). 
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Figure 6. Transmission overhead (TXOV). (a) SMT, (b) SSP.  
5. RELATED WORK 
The protection of the traffic exchanged between two 
communicating nodes has been a fertile area of research outside 
the MANET community, with the Internet security architecture 
(IPsec) being the most prominent effort [8-11]. Goals such as the 
end-to-end authentication, integrity, and replay protection apply 
equally to the MANET context as well. However, the IPsec 
protocols assume the existence of a fixed routing and security 
infrastructure and need to be adapted to the MANET 
environment, if possible. Moreover, IPsec does not provide the 
means to determine the ‘quality’ of the routes and tolerate data 
loss, issues of paramount importance in networks with frequently 
changing connectivity and a significant fraction of adversaries. 
Two transport layer protocols have features that bear some 
resemblance to those of our scheme, although there are 
fundamental differences. It has been proposed to use the IDA 
algorithm [3] to introduce redundancy, so that dropped 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) cells would not cause a TCP 
segment to be dropped [13]. However, in that work, no security 
services are provided, there is no notion of multiple paths, and the 
types of failures are radically different than those we study here. 
The second related protocol is the Stream Control Transport 
Protocol (SCTP) [12]; it relies on the security services of IPsec 
and identifies multi-homed end-points using more than one 
transport address. However, SCTP cannot be applied in our 
malicious MANET context, as it does not determine the actual 
routes. In fact, SCTP data transmitted to different addresses might 
follow different routes. Such an operation can be harmful, since 
switching to a different “path” (transport address) does not 
provide any assurance that the actual multi-hop route will be 
different. Moreover, SCTP can be vulnerable to intermittent 
attacks, with adversaries forwarding “heartbeats,” but dropping 
the actual packets 
The use of multiple paths has been widely studied for the 
provision of quality of service (QoS) guarantees and load 
balancing in wired networks. In MANET, multiple paths have 
been utilized as a means to tolerate path breakages due to 
mobility. One such scheme proposes the use of diversity coding 
and provides an approximation for the probability of successful 
data transmission [6]. Another more recent scheme proposes the 
collection of link quality metrics, and the determination of a 
highly reliable set of link-disjoint paths (as opposed to node 
disjoint paths that we use here). The fast determination of the path 
set yields long-lived path sets that support communication with 
infrequent interruptions [26]. None of the two above-mentioned 
schemes provides security features or mechanisms to assess the 
quality of utilized routes in an end-to-end manner.  
 As for security solutions targeting MANET data transmission, 
the use of multiple routes existing in multi-hop topologies has 
been proposed in the early work of [27] and then in [1]. From a 
different perspective, it has been proposed to detect misbehaving 
MANET nodes and report such events to the rest of the network. 
All the network nodes maintain a set of metrics reflecting the past 
behavior of other nodes and then select routes through relatively 
well-behaved nodes [14]. A more recent work [19], makes the 
additional provision that all nodes have a secure association with 
all other network nodes. Thus, they can authenticate the 
misbehavior reports they exchange with their peers, seeking to 
detect and isolate malicious nodes that do not forward data 
packets. Another method to detect an attacker lying on the 
utilized route has been proposed in [20]. Once the communication 
across the route experiences a loss rate beyond a tolerable 
threshold, the source node initiates a search along the route to 
determine where the failure occurred. To do so, an encrypted and 
authenticated dialogue is initiated with each node along the route, 
with all network nodes assumed being securely associated with all 
their peers. Finally, a different approach [15] provides incentive 
to nodes, so that they comply with protocol rules and properly 
relay user data. The assumed greedy nodes forward packets in 
exchange for fictitious currency. 
In this work, we have assumed the underlying routing protocol 
to be the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [1,2]. In SRP, only the 
end nodes have to be securely associated, with no need for 
cryptographic operations at the intermediate nodes, two factors 
that render SRP efficient and scalable. SRP provides one or more 
route replies, whose correctness is verified by the route 
“geometry” itself, while compromised and invalid routing 
information is discarded. A novel way of query identification 
protects the query propagation and the end nodes from DoS 
attacks, and query packets are handled locally by a priority 
scheme that enhances the robustness and the responsiveness of the 
protocol. Additionally, SRP, assisted by the Neighbor Lookup 
Protocol [5], ensures that adversaries cannot hide themselves from 
a route, and they cannot present themselves as multiple nodes, 
thus providing link-level correct connectivity information. 
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this work, we showed how the data-forwarding phase can be 
secured by a protocol that operates solely in an end-to-end 
manner, without any further assumptions on the network trust and 
behavior of the adversaries. In fact, SMT can counter any attacker 
pattern, either persistent or intermittent, by promptly detecting 
non-operational or compromised routes. Moreover, SMT bounds 
the loss of data incurred by an intelligent adversary that avoids 
detection through manipulation of the path rating scheme. At the 
same time, SMT provides robustness to benign network faults as 
well, whether transient or not. The resilience to transient faults is 
very important, as it avoids discarding routes that are 
operational,14 thus avoiding unnecessary overhead. Furthermore, 
resilience to benign faults, along with malicious ones, is 
important, since in MANET they may be frequent and in practice 
indistinguishable from forms of denial-of-service attacks.  
Fault tolerance is dependent on the ability of the protocol to 
determine and utilize alternative, new routes when it detects non-
operational ones. The multiplicity of routes that are, in general, 
expected to be available in MANET multi-hop topologies can be 
clearly beneficial. The availability or timely determination of 
such redundant routes may be the single most important factor for 
successful transmission across an adverse network. A rich APS, or 
many alternative routes, can be available only at the expense of 
routing overhead. This is generally true for any underlying 
routing protocol, even though the exact amount and type of 
routing overhead depends on the employed routing protocol. 
Increasing the size of the APS will most probably increase the 
routing overhead, which, in the case of reactive routing protocols, 
may result from more frequent route requests and additional 
replies, or, in the case of proactive protocols, more frequent link 
state updates. However, by trading off higher routing overhead, 
increased reliability (that is, higher fraction of delivered 
messages) and lower delays can be achieved.  
In fact, the number of available diverse routes appears to 
control the trade-off between the delay, the routing and the 
transmission overhead, and the fraction of delivered messages. 
For example, the larger the size of the utilized APS, the more 
probable the successful reconstruction of the dispersed message 
will be and, consequently, the fewer the data re-transmissions 
and, thus, the lower the message delay. 
The protocol adapts to either reduce the overhead or increase its 
fault tolerance, by selecting for each message the number of 
paths, among those available, and the redundancy factor. It starts 
with selecting an APS of K shortest (in terms of hops) paths [21]. 
Without having the opportunity to “probe” the paths and 
assuming that initially all nodes are equally probable to be 
malicious, selecting the shortest paths is equivalent to the 
selection of the most secure paths. The source maintains an 
estimate, pi, of the probability that each APS path is operational. 
For each combination of the number of paths, m, and the feasible 
values of r, the probability that a transmission is successful is 
calculated with the estimated values for pi–s in hand. The source 
selects m and r that yield a probability of successful delivery 
equal or as close as possible to the required probability of 
                                                                
                                                                
14 For example, a transient loss can be caused due to network 
impairments or due to an adversary that employs a selective, 
intermittent attack pattern to avoid detection. Nevertheless, the 
route links may remain intact after such transient failures.  
successful message delivery, PGOAL, (determined, for example, by 
the application layer). The reader is referred to [28] for additional 
discussion and implementation details. 
An open issue of interest is how to obtain estimates or 
predictions of the probability that a route will be operational. The 
complexity of such a task is increased, because of the numerous 
factors that affect the condition of the utilized routes. Mobility, 
congestion, transmission impairments, and an arbitrary, possibly 
intermittent and changing over time attack pattern, have to be 
taken into consideration. Through its interaction with the network 
and the feedback it obtains from the trusted destination, each node 
can gradually ‘construct’ such estimates. Clearly, the network 
conditions and characteristics can change over time. More simply, 
parameters such as the network connectivity, density, or the 
number of attackers present can differ according to the nodes’ 
neighborhood. In any case, a feasible estimation method would be 
able only to continuously track15 such changes and to provide 
rough estimates.  
A plausible approach to obtain the probabilities of operational 
routes would be to collect statistics on the lifetimes of all the 
utilized routes.16 It would be helpful to categorize routes 
according to attributes such as the length or whether the route 
includes any additional trusted nodes, other than the destination. 
Moreover, it would be more meaningful to update such 
measurements by assigning a lower weight to earlier observations 
in order to account for the network dynamics. For example, a 
node could quantize path lifetimes and retain measurements and 
estimates for a set of intervals. Then, if a newly determined path 
of length i has been operational for a period t in the [tx,tx+1] 
interval, the node utilizes the estimate of the probability that such 
a path will survive for a period t’ > t, with t’ in the [tx+1,tx+2] 
interval. The investigation and evaluation of such mechanisms are 
left as future work. 
Finally, we note that, despite the use of re-transmissions, SMT 
does not assume the role of a transport layer protocol - it operates 
at the network layer to secure the data forwarding and improve 
significantly the reliability of message delivery. However, SMT 
provides security and protects from frequent disruptions at the 
expense of increased traffic at the network, especially when data 
loss is detected. If there is not enough capacity in the network (at 
the link and at the network layers) to accommodate both the data 
flows and the SMT’s overhead, the upper layer data rate could be 
decreased, for example, by the congestion control mechanism of 
the transport layer protocol. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have presented the SMT protocol to secure the 
data forwarding operation for MANET routing protocols. Our 
protocol takes advantage of topological and transmission 
redundancies and utilizes feedback, exchanged only between the 
two communicating end-nodes. This way, SMT remains effective 
even under highly adverse conditions. Moreover, features such as 
low-cost encoding and validation mechanisms, and partial 
retransmissions render the scheme efficient. By relying solely on 
the end-to-end security associations, SMT can secure effectively 
the data transmission without prior knowledge of the network 
15 Rather than determine from ‘cold’. 
16 The lifetime defined as the period from the determination of a 
route till the route is deemed failed. 
trust model or the degree of trustworthiness of the intermediate 
nodes.  
Our performance evaluation confirms that SMT can naturally 
complement any protocol that secures the route discovery and can 
shield the network operation by delivering up to 250% more 
packets despite the presence of substantial fraction of nodes as 
attackers. We also confirmed that SMT outperforms SSP, a 
single-path secure data transmission protocol equipped with the 
SMT’s mechanisms. The end-to-end delays achieved by SMT are 
up to 94% lower than the delays of SSP. Yet, SMT delivers up to 
22% more messages. And it does so with 68% lower routing 
overhead and only with up to 48% data and feedback transmission 
overhead. In conclusion, SMT’s low overhead and its efficient 
and effective operation render SMT applicable to a wide range of 
MANET instances. The highly successful delivery of messages, 
in spite of the presence of adversaries and, most importantly, the 
low end-to-end delay clue on the ability of the protocol to support 
QoS for real-time traffic. 
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